A Deep Look into the Endless Conflict in West Pokot County, Rift Valley Region, Kenya

By Salome Juma

The county of West Pokot, situated in Kenya’s Rift Valley Region along the border with Uganda, has for decades been plagued by a complex and multi‑layered conflict. The persistent violence — driven largely by cattle raiding, banditry, resource competition, weak state presence, and cultural factors — has not only claimed lives but also held back development, fostered displacement, and perpetuated cycles of retribution. In this article I explore the origins, key drivers, current dynamics, and possible pathways toward peace for West Pokot’s conflict.

Background and geography

West Pokot County lies in the north‑western part of Kenya, bordering Uganda to the west, and neighbouring counties within the North Rift region. According to one source:

It has an estimated land area of 9,169.4 km² and population around 621,241.
The economy is predominantly livestock rearing, with small‑scale agriculture.
Social cohesion in the county is measured at about 51 % — below the Kenyan national average — indicating high vulnerability to conflict.

Geographically, the terrain, sparse infrastructure, and marginalised services make many parts of West Pokot remote and difficult to govern effectively. The border areas with counties like Turkana County, and with Uganda, also mean that cross‑border movement of people, livestock and arms is a factor.

2. Historical roots of the conflict

The conflict in West Pokot is not new; its roots trace back decades with several overlapping causes:

Cultural practices: Among the Pokot community, cattle represent wealth, prestige, and secured livelihoods. The act of raiding — while illicit from the state’s view — has long been embedded in customs. As one scholarly article puts it: “a cultural belief in raiding is perpetuated … based on their myth of origin and a belief that all cattle belong to them.” Open Journals University of Toledo
Cattle raiding, revenge cycles and weapons proliferation: The region has witnessed cycles of raids and retaliations — e.g., between the Pokot and neighbouring communities — which over time have evolved from spears and bows to automatic firearms. According to a regional note: “The Pokot manage to buy some World War II guns and automatic weapons from Somali cattle traders.”
Resource and land competition: Scarcity of pasture and water in marginal lands, coupled with territorial disputes and unclear boundaries, have heightened tensions.
Weak state presence and insecurity: Remote areas of West Pokot have had limited infrastructure, policing, and public services, making them vulnerable to armed groups, banditry and lawlessness.

The result: a long‑standing structural conflict environment where violence is normalised and hard to break.

3. Key drivers of the conflict

a) Livestock theft and cattle raiding

Cattle form the backbone of the local economy for many in West Pokot. Raids and theft thus strike at the very heart of livelihoods. The phenomenon is facilitated by proximity to borders, weapons availability, and youth unemployment.

b) Resource scarcity — pasture, water, land

One of the repeating themes: herders in West Pokot must move vast distances in search of pasture and water, often crossing into neighbouring counties or even across the border. These movements spark conflict. For example:

“Hunger and pasture searching is the major cause of perennial conflict.” – Deputy Governor of West Pokot.
Another initiative: The refurbishment of a water pan in Masol Ward is aimed explicitly at lowering conflict:
“The water pan … will boost peace … since initially residents used to clash owing to the scramble for water and pasture.”

c) Weapons proliferation & weak disarmament

Illegal firearms and home‐guard militias make the violence more lethal. The region’s remoteness and porous borders make arms flow more feasible. A report notes:

“The Pokot manage to buy some … automatic weapons … from Somali cattle traders.”

d) Ethnic‑territorial tensions and revenge logic

Communities in the North Rift region (Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Baringo etc) have overlapping claims, cross‐border linkages, and often engage in retaliatory violence. The logic of “you raided us, we’ll raid you” sustains cycles of violence.

e) Marginalisation and governance gaps

Development indicators in West Pokot lag behind many other parts of Kenya. Poor infrastructure, weak state institutions, limited economic opportunities, and low levels of education contribute to the vulnerability of the region to violence. The West Pokot region’s low social cohesion index (51%) underpins this.

f) Political incitement and strategic manipulation

Some analyses point to political actors exploiting the conflict for electoral or economic advantage — for example, by aligning with militia actors or failing to prosecute perpetrators of raids.

4. Recent developments and the “endless” nature of the conflict

The conflict continues to persist for several reasons:

Security operations with limited success: The Kenyan government has deployed security agencies, sometimes deploying the military, to crack down on bandits and weapons. However, local leaders have argued that operations alone are not enough and may even aggravate grievances.
Joint peace‑building efforts: In recent years, county governments of West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Baringo have signed joint resolutions and roadmaps to address the banditry and open up development in the North Rift region.
Development initiatives: For instance, the water pan project in Masol Ward targets one of the root causes (water scarcity) to reduce conflict.
Dialogue and traditional conflict‑resolution forums: Engaging elders, clergy, and local leaders in forums along border areas like Chemusto (between West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet) is seen as an avenue for lasting peace.
But persistent triggers remain: The structural drivers (scarcity, arms, culture of raiding, marginalisation) continue to loom; thus, conflict remains “endless” in the sense that new incidents of banditry, raids, killings and displacements continue to occur. A regional note puts it bluntly: “Key conflict drivers include competition for water and pasture, disputed land and territorial boundaries, and cattle rustling, all exacerbated by inadequate policing and ethnicism.” interpeace.org

Because of these interlinked root causes and the fact that each new raid resets the cycle of vengeance, the conflict remains very difficult to break.

5. Effects of the conflict

The toll of the conflict on West Pokot and its people is heavy:

Loss of lives: Many incidents of raiding and banditry lead to death of herders, children, women and community members.
Livestock losses: Cattle and goats being stolen undermines livelihoods. The theft of livestock also diminishes household assets and pushes families further into poverty.
Displacement: People flee villages, abandon farms and livestock, and become internally displaced. An older report from neighbouring counties indicates thousands were displaced as a result of raids.
Education disruption: Schools have at times been closed or students forced to stay home because of insecurity in the Kerio Valley region.
Stalled development: The constant insecurity discourages investors, road construction, access to services and general economic growth. As one statement put it: “Many years of banditry have caused almost all development programmes to stall in the Kerio Valley region.”
Psychosocial trauma: The fear, mourning of lost loved ones, dismantled communities and erratic livelihoods all contribute to long‑term trauma and instability.

6. Why the conflict seems “endless”

Understanding why the conflict continues despite many peace efforts helps us appreciate the complexity:

Embedded cultural systems: Raiding and cattle theft are not merely criminal acts but have cultural roots in the identity of certain pastoralist communities. Attempting to break those requires cultural transformation, not just law enforcement.
Feedback loops of retaliation: A raid leads to revenge; revenge leads to counter‑raids; the cycle continues. Without strong deterrents and reconciliatory mechanisms, the loop perpetuates.
Weak institutions and governance: Remote areas mean fewer police, weaker justice systems, minimal oversight and little investment. This creates zones where bandits operate with impunity.
Multiple overlapping conflicts: It’s not just Pokot vs Marakwet; there is Pokot vs Turkana, Pokot vs Uganda’s Karamojong, boundary disputes, resource competition, and political manipulation. Each adds a layer.
Economic desperation and youth bulge: With limited opportunities for young men, raiding and banditry become one of the few “livelihood options,” especially when tradition supports it.
Arms availability and mobility: Guns and ammunition flow through borders and are cheaper to obtain than building a school or hospital. The presence of arms turns what could have been disputes over cattle into lethal violence.
Incomplete interventions: Many peace initiatives focus on one driver (e.g., water, dialogue, policing) but do not simultaneously address cultural, economic, institutional and resource dimensions. Without a holistic approach, the problem persists.

7. What is being done — progress and shortcomings

Progress

Livestock branding and movement regulation: Three governors (West Pokot, Baringo, Elgeyo Marakwet) agreed to brand livestock and stop movement of un‑branded animals in 19 wards as a measure to curb theft.
Water and infrastructure projects: The rehabilitation of the Masol Ward water pan (serving 3,000 households and 10,000 animals) is a tangible investment in reducing resource‑scarcity‑driven conflict.
Peace dialogues and community forums: Forums involving elders, youth, religious leaders are being convened along conflict fringes (e.g., Chemusto area) to foster reconciliation and cross‑community ties.
Regional cooperation and roadmap adoption: In July 2023, North Rift governors endorsed a roadmap to end banditry, committing to development and peace instead of only security operations.

Shortcomings

Security operations with limited strategy shift: Some local leaders argue that current security‐only approaches yield lives and livestock lost without addressing root causes.
Peace initiatives not always well‑resourced or sustained: Dialogues and projects may falter without long term funding or institutional backing.
Cultural transformation slow: Changing norms around raiding and cattle theft is a generational challenge, and the pace is slow.
Still weak presence of state services: Many areas remain under‑served in terms of health, education, policing — making sustainable peace harder.
Political will and accountability: Some reports suggest that political actors may still exploit conflict for gains, and that disarmament of illegal groups remains incomplete.

8. Pathways to genuine, lasting peace

While no simple “silver bullet” exists, evidence suggests the following integrated strategy may stand a better chance:

Holistic resource development: Building water pans, boreholes, pasture reserves, irrigation projects to reduce scarcity‑driven movement of livestock and thereby reduce conflict incentives.
Institutional strengthening: Deploying more trained police officers, building local justice mechanisms, ensuring state presence in remote areas to deter raids and provide timely justice.
Livelihood diversification and youth empowerment: Creating alternative jobs and economic opportunities — especially for young men who might otherwise join raiding. This works alongside pastoralism rather than simply replacing it.
Cultural and community‑led change: Working with elders, youth, women, and religious groups to shift norms around raiding, revenge, and violence. Events like peace races and cross‑community sports/education help build social capital. For example, the Tegla Loroupe Peace Race in West Pokot unites warriors and youths from rival tribes through sports.
Livestock tracking and branding mechanisms: This makes stolen animals easier to identify and discourage theft. The branding initiative in North Rift is a promising start.
Dialogue, reconciliation and boundary clarifications: Working to settle territorial disputes, provide forums for victims and perpetrators, promote forgiveness and forward‑looking relationships.
Coordination regionally and cross‑border: Because the conflict involves cross‑county and cross‑border dimensions (Turkana, Uganda, Marakwet), peace efforts must be regional, not just local.
Political accountability and disarmament: Arms flow, impunity and patronage networks must be addressed. Ensuring that perpetrators are not sheltered by politicians is critical.
Long‑term commitment: This isn’t a short‑term intervention. Peacebuilding, cultural change and economic transformation will take years if not decades.

9. Conclusion

The conflict in West Pokot is “endless” not because it can’t be solved, but because its root causes are deeply embedded, multiple and mutually reinforcing. The interplay of culture, scarcity, weapons, marginalisation and weak governance creates a storm that has proven resilient to one‑dimensional solutions.

However, the recent combination of dialogue, development projects, regional cooperation and new regulatory efforts (branding livestock) does offer hope that the cycle can be broken. If stakeholders — communities, county and national governments, NGOs and donors — commit to a multi‑pronged, sustained strategy, West Pokot may gradually shift from a focus on conflict to a focus on development and peace.